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THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIETAL NORMS: 
A MODERN CASE FOR FEMALE BREAST EQUALITY 
 
Brenna Helppie-Schmieder 
 
Abstract 
“The Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern Case for Female Breast Equality” 
argues that laws prohibiting the public display of the female breast, but not the male breast, are 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  That these laws 
discriminate against women is obvious, yet courts have historically refused to recognize an 
Equal Protection Clause violation.  However, the primary reasons courts rely upon are ripe for 
review. Most significantly, courts typically justify female breast censorship laws based on the 
government interest in protecting public sensibilities, without recognizing that public 
sensibilities change.  Indeed, perceptions of the public female breast have changed.  Taking 
these modern-day perceptions into account reveals that the protection of public sensibilities is, in 
fact, an inadequate governmental interest. Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause principles, as 
articulated in US v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, provide further support for finding 
female breast censorship laws unconstitutional.  This Article also explains why female breast 
censorship laws are normatively harmful to both women and society. Ultimately, “The 
Constitution and Societal Norms: A Modern Case for Female Breast Equality” argues that laws 
prohibiting the public display of the female breast, but not the male breast, are harmful, 
outdated, and unconstitutional. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, should be 
deemed unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.1  Several 
states and municipalities have laws prohibiting obscenity and public nudity.  But many such 
laws, in addition to outlawing the public display of genitals, outlaw the public display of the 
female breast.  Although the normativity of obscenity and public nudity laws are an issue in their 
own right, this Article focuses specifically on the censorship of female breasts.2   
For example, Louisiana’s obscenity statute carries a punishment of up to three years 
imprisonment or a $2,500 fine for a first time conviction.3  Under this statute, obscenity is 
defined as the “[e]xposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva, or female breast nipples in any 
public place . . . with the intent of arousing sexual desire or which appeals to prurient interest or 
is patently offensive.”4  In Delaware, “[a] male is guilty of indecent exposure in the second 
degree if he exposes his genitals or buttocks under circumstances in which he knows his conduct 
is likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.”5  A female is guilty of the same if “she 
exposes her genitals, breast or buttocks under circumstances in which she knows her conduct is 
likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.”6 In Chicago, one can be fined between $100 
                                                
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
2 In this Article, I use “censorship” as an umbrella term that encompasses the many ways the female breast is legally 
regulated separate and unique from the male breast.  I use the word “female” to refer to people born biologically 
female, as that is how courts understand classifications based on sex.  See generally, Luke Boso, A (Trans)gender-
Inclusive Equal Protection Analysis of Public Female Toplessness, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 143, 13–20 (2009) 
(arguing that courts’ rigid understanding of sex undermines commonly-made arguments upholding female breast 
censorship laws).  I use the word “women” to refer to individuals who identify as women. 
3 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (G)(1)(2014). 
4 Id. § 14:106 (A)(1) (emphasis added).  Were a constitutional challenge like the one discussed in Part III to fail, one 
could use the same evidence of society’s current norms to defend against prosecutions under statutes like 
Louisiana’s on the ground that the exposed female nipple on its own does not appeal to the prurient interest and is 
not patently offensive.  Thus, unless the defendant intends to arouse sexual desire, the prosecution cannot prove the 
necessary elements of the statute. 
5 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 764(a) (1995).  
6 Id. § 764(b) (emphasis added). 
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and $500 for indecent exposure, which includes exposing to public view: “the genitals, vulva, 
pubis, pubic hair, buttocks, perineum, anus, anal region, or pubic hair region of any person, or 
any portion of the breast at or below the upper edge of the areola thereof of any female person.”7 
In the United States, female breast censorship is far-reaching.  State laws and municipal 
ordinances that censor the female breast include “zoning ordinances, public exposure or 
lewdness ordinances and statutes, ordinances regulating sexually-oriented businesses, laws aimed 
at nude sunbathing, regulations of business and liquor licenses, and obscenity statutes.”8  Given 
the ad hoc tangle of laws and ordinances that censor, regulate, and criminalize the female breast, 
this Article focuses on the higher level constitutional issues bound up in any regulation of the 
female breast.  The censorship of the public female breast, but not the public male breast, should 
be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Such censorship violates the Equal Protection 
Clause because one’s breast is regulated under a different set of laws if one is female rather than 
male.  Surprisingly, however, many courts that have confronted Equal Protection Clause 
arguments regarding this issue have upheld these facially discriminatory laws.9  This Article 
offers a modern challenge.10 
                                                
7 Chicago, Code of Ordinances § 8-8-080 (emphasis added). 
8 Virginia F. Milstead, Forbidding Female Toplessness: Why "Real Difference" Jurisprudence Lacks "Support" and 
What Can Be Done About It, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 273, 276–77 (2005).  
9 See infra Part III. 
10 A significant scholarship exists which analyzes breast censorship laws under the Equal Protection Clause from a 
variety of angles. See, e.g., Carmen M. Cusack, Boob Laws: An Analysis of Social Deviance Within Gender, 
Families, or the Home (Etudes 2), 33 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 197, 197–98 (2012) (advancing “three different 
constitutional arguments to prove that municipalities that prohibit some females from exposing their nipples should 
be challenged on constitutional grounds.”); see also Milstead, supra note 8, at 278–79 (“seek[ing] to dismantle the 
doctrine of real difference as the standard of review for Fourteenth Amendment gender cases . . . seek[ing] to reveal 
that these differences do not provide the best threshold determination for equal protection.” (citations omitted)); see 
also Christina DeJong & Christopher E. Smith, Equal Protection, Gender, and Justice at the Dawn of A New 
Century, 14 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 125 (1999) (“explor[ing] the applicability of equal protection principles to the 
field of criminal justice,” including breast exposure laws); see generally Alyssa Silver, Breasts on the Beach: Legal 
in New York?, 9 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 217 (1994) (focusing on New York’s legal history and treatment of the public 
female breast). This Article adds to the argument by: presenting modern evidence of changing public norms to 
specifically challenge the oft-proffered “public sensibilities” governmental interest, see e.g., People v. David, 152 
Misc. 2d 66, 67 (Munroe Cnty. Ct. 1991), discussing new decisions at the intersection of First Amendment and 
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This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I surveys the history of female breast 
censorship, including highlighting the shifting societal opinion of the public female breast over 
time.  This history lays the groundwork to show that the sexualization of the female breast has 
allowed for its continued censorship.  
Part I also includes a primer of First Amendment doctrine as it relates to obscenity law 
and expressive speech.  Although the First Amendment has a role to play in combating 
discriminatory obscenity laws, it is ancillary in this Article. This is because the First Amendment 
protects only some instances of the public female breast. The Equal Protection Clause goes much 
further.  
Next, in order to frame the argument in Part III, Part I reviews the Equal Protection 
Clause doctrine as it relates to sex.  The doctrine has produced the following intermediate 
scrutiny test for judging the constitutionality of laws that classify on the basis of sex: the sex-
based classification must have an important—or exceedingly persuasive—governmental 
objective, and the means must be substantially related to that objective.11 
Finally, Part I explores some of the few cases in which courts have struck down female 
breast censorship laws. The argument in Part III builds on, and augments, the reasoning in these 
decisions.  
Part II makes three normative arguments as to why female breast censorship is harmful.  
First, such censorship perpetuates heterosexual male definitions of eroticism, contributing to the 
sexual and political subjugation of women.  Second, female breast censorship laws enforce 
dangerous body image issues.  Lastly, and most simply, these laws deprive women of the choice 
to be comfortable.  Part II, then, elucidates the real-world implications of female breast 
                                                                                                                                                       
Equal Protection Clause challenges, and suggesting that recent Supreme Court precedent further supports finding 
female breast censorship laws unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 
11 See infra Part I.D; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
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censorship in an effort to show that arguing for, or against, female breast equality is much more 
than a theoretical exercise.  
Finally, using the two-pronged intermediate scrutiny test as an anchor, Part III 
demonstrates that female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Courts that 
uphold female breast censorship laws commonly cite the protection of public sensibilities as the 
important governmental objective that satisfies the first prong.  The changing understanding of 
the public female breast, however, severely undermines this justification.  Indeed, public norms 
now include a growing acceptance of the public female breast.  Moreover, recent Supreme Court 
dicta about Equal Protection Clause principles lend additional support to the conclusion that 
female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Ultimately, this Article aims 
to persuade that laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, are 
outdated, harmful, and unconstitutional.  
I. BREAST CENSORSHIP AND FRAMING THE LAW   
 
A. History of Society’s Perception of the Female Breast  
 
The history of society’s perception of the female breast sheds some light on why its legal 
censorship is a modern-day reality.12  Important to keep in mind, however, is that “much of the 
documented epic of the [female] breast is a voyeuristic one, told from the perspective of those 
who lack the organs yet still claim ultimate authority on the subject.”13  That men have been the 
primary authors of history is not a radical notion; but, when analyzing how the female breast 
                                                
12 See Danielle Moriber, Note, A Right to Bare All? Female Public Toplessness and Dealing with the Laws That 
Prohibit, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 453, 454 (2010) (“The wide variety of laws regulating women more 
stringently than men demonstrates a societal gender differentiation in conceptualizing chests.” (citations omitted)). 
13 Natalie Angier, Goddesses, Harlots and Other Male Fantasies, 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/02/23/reviews/970223.23angiert.html (reviewing MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY 
OF THE BREAST (1997)) (“Ms. Yalom . . . found very little in the record to indicate how women have felt about their 
breasts: whether they took pleasure in them, the extent to which they chose to display their breasts or if they had any 
say in the debate over wet-nursing.”) 
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came to be censored and regulated in the United States, it is a notable factor.  The historicizing of 
the female breast by men, after all, can be understood as a type of censorship itself.14   
The following is an abbreviated, primarily Western, history of the female breast.15  From 
the ancient civilizations to modern day United States, society’s understanding of the female 
breast has fluctuated.  Throughout history, however, two dominant understandings of the female 
breast emerge: its biological function and its erotic nature.16  As will be seen, the eroticization of 
the female breast is what allows for its continued censorship.     
In pre-Greek ancient civilizations, female breasts were emphasized and idolized, as 
evidenced by artwork and statues depicting gods with full, uncovered breasts.17  Much of the 
idolizing revolved around women’s lactation abilities.18  However, the public veneration of the 
female breast faded with the rise of ancient Greece, during which time the breast was slowly 
“supplanted by . . . the ‘reign of the phallus.’”19 
 Between 6th century BC and 1st century AD, the general time period of the events in the 
Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) and Christian New Testament, society’s understanding of the 
female breast returned to a place of honor.20  Society valued the breast for its capacity to feed 
infants, highlighting a cultural focus on women as mothers.21 
                                                
14 See ADELINE MASQUELIER, DIRT, UNDRESS, AND DIFFERENCE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY'S  
SURFACE 4 (2005) (“[W]omen’s bodies have historically provided a fertile terrain for imagining, reasserting, or 
contesting the porous boundaries of moral worlds. The sexualization of power relations and the erotics of 
conquest—often represented as the male penetration of a veiled female interior—have proven remarkably 
resilient.”). 
15 Much of this history is informed by scholar Marilyn Yalom’s work: MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE 
BREAST (1997). 
16 See generally MARILYN YALOM, A HISTORY OF THE BREAST (1997). 
17 See id. at 10–12. 
18 See id. at 9–10. 
19 Id. at 16 (quoting classics scholar, Eva Keuls). 
20 Id. at 5. (“[W]e find women validated primarily as mothers. . . [i]n both the Jewish and Christian 
traditions, breasts were honored as milk-producing vessels necessary for the survival of the Hebrew people 
and, later, the followers of Jesus.”). 
21 See id.  
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This view faded with the Renaissance, during which the female breast took on a sexual 
connotation.22  By the fifteenth century, art and literature began depicting women’s breasts as 
erotic.23  Paintings showed women holding out their breasts, “served up like a piece of fruit for 
the delectation of an observer,” or a man’s hand cupped around a woman’s breast which “spoke 
for the sense of possession that men believed was their due.”24  
In the seventeenth century the pendulum began to swing back toward an understanding of 
the female breast as mainly biological—that is, existing to provide for children.25  Around this 
time, mothers began to nurse their own infants, turning away from wet nurses.26  Some artwork 
depicting women with exposed breasts, which represented democratic government, exemplified 
the public belief in mothers as contributing to the community through child-rearing.27 Then 
again, other artwork seemed to continue the emphasis on the erotic breast.28  
Eighteenth-century England marked a cultural high point for the obsession with women 
as mothers.29  Motherhood was revered and becoming less associated with sexuality.30  
                                                
22 See generally, YALOM, supra note 16, Chapter Two: The Erotic Breast: “Orbs of Heavenly Frame.” 
23 YALOM, supra note 16, at 5. 
24 Angier, supra note 13 (quoting YALOM). 
25 YALOM, supra note 16, at 5 (this understanding was in the context of mothers being “seen as making a 
major contribution to the overall well-being of her household and community”). 
26 See id.; see also Emily E. Stevens, et al., A History of Infant Feeding, 18(2) J PERINATAL EDUC. 32 
(Spring 2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2684040/ (reviewing the 
“widespread disapproval of wet nursing” during the Renaissance, the changes in the profession of wet 
nursing, and the different practices among social classes). 
27 See YALOM, supra note 16, at 5–6; see generally id. Chapter 4: The Political Breast: Bosoms for the 
Nation. 
28 See Anne Hollander, Fashion in Nudity, 30 Ga. Rev. 642, 661 (1976) (discussing the eroticism of the bodice in 
fashion at the time, and noting “[t]he late seventeenth century abounds, for example, in paintings of ladies with very 
emphatic breasts escaping from their necklines- breasts which seem larger, rounder, and shinier than similarly 
unveiled ones in earlier centuries . . . Even the most consciously erotic mammary displays in the Renaissance were 
modest in size and sometimes vague in shape compared with those in certain Dutch or Italian versions painted after 
1670.”). 
29 See generally Ruth Perry, Colonizing the Breast: Sexuality and Maternity in Eighteenth-Century 
England, 2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, 204, 214 (1991). 
30 See id. at 215. 
 
 
8 
Unsurprisingly, along with this shift came a renewed cultural focus on the biological, rather than 
the sexual, purposes of women’s breasts.31 
 The understanding of women as homemakers and mothers continued into the nineteenth-
century Victorian Era.32  During this time, women wore constricting clothing.33  Restrictive 
garments, also popular in the United States, “called for almost complete covering of the upper 
body.”34  Thus, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century fashion can be viewed as a type of societal 
female breast censorship, which emphasized women’s relegation to the domestic sphere.35   
 The nineteenth century also gave rise to the new fields of psychology and psychoanalysis, 
which merged the breast’s biological purpose of feeding infants with a sexual significance.36  
The founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, was attempting to prove that “sucking at the 
breast was not only the child’s first activity, but also the starting point of one’s entire sexual 
life.”37  The western history of the female breast is much a story about society’s emphasis of the 
breast as primarily biological or primarily sexual.  In both cases, historical indicators suggest that 
society played a significant role in how women should understand their own breasts. 
B. The Modern Female Breast and Its Censorship  
 
In the twentieth century, women in the United States began publically demanding a voice 
in how to define their breasts, although such definitions still revolved largely around sexuality 
                                                
31 See id. at 215–16.   
32 See Moriber, supra note 12, at 456 (in the Victorian era, there were “no meaningful job opportunities 
available for women, and, because they were dependent on men, their role in society centered around 
entertaining and keeping house.” (citation omitted)).  
33 See id. at 456 (e.g., girdles and petticoats). 
34 Id. (citation omitted). 
35 Jill Fields, 'Fighting the Corsetless Evil': Shaping Corsets and Culture, 1900-1930, 33 J. SOC. HIST. 355, 355–56 
(1999) (noting that “[s]cholarship on nineteenth-century women's history and dress explores the power of corsets to 
regulate women's behavior as well as to signify women's subordinate status,” but acknowledging scholarly 
disagreement about the meaning of the corset). 
36 See YALOM, supra note 16, at 6. 
37 Id.  In this same time period, with the rise of mass-production capabilities, the female breast also became 
ripe for commercialization and profit.  Factory-made corsets, and eventually bras, worked their way into 
the national stream of commerce. Id.  
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and biology.  These two understandings not only fit into a historical framework but also a 
scientific one.   
People have long debated why female breasts evolutionarily exist.  Some argue that 
female breasts are a naturally selected organ, existing for the purpose of feeding infants.38  
Others argue that female breasts are sexually selected organs, existing due to male sexual 
preference.39  On one hand, female breasts help create and store fat that allows for easier 
lactation, which is used to feed infants.40  On the other hand, “a woman’s attractiveness to [men] 
seems to have been enhanced by breast development.”41  Although it is true that the size and 
shape of the female breast can play a role in sexual attractiveness,42 there is no consensus as to 
whether males’ sexual attraction to female breasts was secondary to breasts’ biological function, 
or vice versa.43   
In the 1960s and 70s, two breast-related social phenomena took hold: bra-burning and 
breast implants.44  Some women refused to wear bras as a cultural statement of women’s 
empowerment.45  Other women sought to surgically enlarge their breast size to enhance their 
                                                
38 See Tracy Clark-Flory, On the rack: A cultural history of breasts, SALON (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/05/10/on_the_rack_a_cultural_history_of_breasts/ (interviewing author Florence 
Williams). 
39 See id. 
40 Id. 
41 Peter Anderson, Rose E. Frisch, et al., The Reproductive Role of the Human Breast [and Comments and Reply], 
24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, 25, 26 (1983). 
42 Id. 
43 See Clark-Flory, supra note 38. 
44 See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7; Clark-Flory, supra note 38 (“The first silicon breast implant was performed in 
1962. . . It was particularly popular among women who made their living onstage . . . Eventually it leaked into the 
broader culture, and certainly by the ’70s and ’80s women were going for this. Then there was the implant scare of 
the ’90s, in which a lot of women had problems with their implants, and the FDA actually banned them for 14 years. 
But now they’re back . . . In fact, more women are getting implants now than ever before — over 300,000 a year.”). 
45 See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7 (“By burning bras, more figuratively than literally, women undermined the basic 
idea of control coming from outside oneself.  Henceforth women could question the authority of such previously 
sacrosanct agencies as medicine and fashion.”); Alix Kates Shulman, Sex and Power: Sexual Bases of Radical 
Feminism, 5 Signs: Jour. of Women in Culture and Society, 590, 594–95 (recounting the early demonstration that 
led to the myth of literal bra-burning, in which sixty feminists picketed the Miss American Pageant, including by 
filling a trash can with “items of female ‘torture’ like curlers, bras, girdles, and high-heeled shoes.”) 
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attractiveness.46  Both actions revolved around a woman’s choice of how her breasts would be 
displayed, which marked an important moment in the history of the female breast.47   
At the same time, however, states began enacting public nudity and indecency laws48 that 
explicitly prohibited public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast.49  
Municipalities also enacted such ordinances.  In 1967, for example, New York revised its 
previously gender-neutral public anti-exposure statute to specifically restrict the female breast.50  
The very categories of these laws—obscenity, lewdness, public nudity—reveal that the 
sexualization of the female breast is what leads to its censorship.51  Indeed, most states have 
                                                
46 See M. Grigg, et al. Information for Women About the Safety of Silicone Breast Implants (2000), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44775/. 
47 See YALOM, supra note 16, at 7–8. 
48 The common law, too, imposed limits on public nudity.  See Duvallon v. State, 404 So. 2d 196, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981) (“At common law, indecent exposure was a public nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor. It was 
viewed as an offense against religion and morality, involving ‘open and grossly scandalous lewdness.’ Rex v. 
Sedley, (1963) 1 Sid. 168, is often cited by commentators as support for this view. Today, the common law crime 
has been supplanted by statutory offenses in almost every jurisdiction in this country. These statutes vary somewhat 
as to wording, but a survey of the case law indicates that many of the same elements of the common law crime have 
been retained.” (citations omitted)). 
49 See, e.g., Indiana’s Indecent Exposure statute, effective in 1977, defines nudity as “the showing of the human 
male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female 
breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of covered male genitals in a 
discernibly turgid state.” IND. CODE ANN § 35-45-4-1 (West 2015). Delaware’s indecent exposure statute, passed in 
1982, finds a female guilty of second degree indecent exposure “if she exposes her genitals, breast or buttocks under 
circumstances in which she knows her conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm to another person.” DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 764(b) (West)(2015). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-301 (West 2015) (defining “intimate parts” as 
“external genitalia, perineum, anus or pubes of any person or the breast of a female person.”). Though not 
comprehensive, the sample of statutes at least hints at the possible correlation between women taking breast 
definition into their own hands with states specifically taking aim to limit the public female breast.  Later, states and 
cities turned to zoning laws to regulate nudity and sex-based businesses, giving special attention to the female 
breast. See, e.g., Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing 1995 New York City 
Council regulation restricting sexually-oriented businesses). 
50 New York’s anti-exposure law, first adopted in 1881, was revised in 1935 to prohibit nudity and nudist colonies, 
was recodified in 1964 under “public lewdness,” and was amended in 1967 “specifically to cover ‘exposure of a 
female,’” which included not covering “her breast below the top of the aureola” [sic].  Reena N. Glazer, Women's 
Body Image and the Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 113, 119, n. 42 (1993) (citing 1967 N.Y. Laws 1074, amended by 1970 
N.Y. Laws 100, repealed by 1983 N.Y. Laws 1574). The statute also included an exception for women “entertaining 
or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.” Id. at 120. 
51 See Moriber, supra note 12 (“In the United States . . . women have traditionally been made to cover their breasts 
because of a socially ascribed sexual meaning.”); and Glazer, supra note 50, at 135; and Clark-Flory, supra note 38 
(“the sexualization of breasts is a reality and we’re not going to change that any time soon”). 
 
 
11 
passed laws to allow the public female breast during breastfeeding,52 demonstrating that female 
breast censorship has little, if anything, to do with its biological function.    
The modern legal censorship of the public female breast, however, is inconsistent with 
the growing societal acceptance of the public female breast—an acceptance accelerated by social 
media.  For example, in 2014, Scout Willis, the daughter of actors Demi Moore and Bruce 
Willis, walked around New York City with her breasts exposed as a form of protest.53  Willis 
was protesting Instagram, the social media picture-sharing website, because of its policy 
categorizing displays of the female areola as “instances of abuse.”54  Willis explained: 
Women are regularly kicked off Instagram for posting photos with any portion of 
the areola exposed, while photos sans nipple -- degrading as they might be -- 
remain unchallenged. So I walked around New York topless and documented it 
on Twitter, pointing out that what is legal by New York state law is not allowed 
on Instagram.55 
 
Willis’s action added fuel to Free the Nipple, a campaign for equal topless56 rights for 
women, when she used the #FreetheNipple hashtag during her protest.57  Lina Esco, creator of 
the campaign as well as a film of the same name, has argued, “[t]he boob or the nipple is the first 
                                                
52 See National Conference of State Legislatures, Breastfeeding State Laws, September 2, 2015, available 
at http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx (noting that “[f]orty-nine states, the 
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have laws that specifically allow women to breastfeed in any 
public or private location,” and “[t]wenty-nine states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands 
exempt breastfeeding from public indecency laws.”). 
53 See Stephanie Marcus, Scout Willis Posts Topless Photos On Twitter To Protest Instagram's Anti-Nudity 
Policy, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (May 28, 2014, 4:16pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/28/scout-
willis-topless_n_5405769.html/.  
54 Scout Willis, Scout Willis Topless Instagram Protest, XOJANE.COM, (June 2, 2014), 
http://www.xojane.com/issues/scout-willis-topless-instagram-protest. 
55 Id. 
56 Sometimes referred to as “topfree.” See, e.g., Topfree Equal Rights Association (TERA), http://www.tera.ca/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
57 See #FreeTheNipple: Topless Protest Against Internet Censorship Follows Scout Willis Instagram 
Challenge, HUFFINGTONPOST.CO.UK (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:37BST), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/04/freethenipple-topless-protest-internet-censorship-scout-willis-
instagram-challenge-pictures_n_5443907.html; see also What is Free the Nipple, FREE THE NIPPLE (2014), 
http://www.freethenipple.com/. 
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thing you see when you’re born, it’s the thing you depend on, it’s the first thing that nourishes 
us, at what point did it become an obscene thing?”58  
The Topfree Rights Association (TERA) is another example of the modern movement for 
female breast equality.59  This organization was formed in Canada in 1997,60 and provides legal 
aid for female topless issues, mostly in Canada and the United States.  TERA’s statement of 
purpose describes being motivated by simple equality, individual choice, and female comfort.61  
GoTopless, yet another example of the modern era of female breast definition and 
equality, focuses on a growing willingness of women to bare their nude breasts in public.  
GoTopless was founded in 2007, and promotes Go Topless Day, in which women are 
encouraged to bare their breasts, and males are encouraged to wear bikinis or bras.62  
Willis’s demonstration, Free the Nipple, TERA, and GoTopless might be characterized as 
political protests, and, therefore, fairly questioned in terms of how representative they are of 
societal norms of the female breast.  After all, political protests typically emerge to change 
societal norms.  Still, that these protests have cropped up in the last twenty years, and three in the 
last eight years, is evidence that substantial segments of society find female breast censorship 
laws repugnant enough to take action against them.  
                                                
58 #FreeTheNipple: Topless Protest Against Internet Censorship Follows Scout Willis Instagram 
Challenge, HUFFINGTONPOST.CO.UK (Apr. 6, 2014, 12:37BST), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/06/04/freethenipple-topless-protest-internet-censorship-scout-willis-
instagram-challenge-pictures_n_5443907.html 
59 See Statement of Purpose and Principles, TOPFREE EQUAL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.tera.ca/index.html#Purpose (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). 
60 News Releases, TOPFREE EQUAL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (Jun. 14, 1997), 
http://www.tera.ca/news.html#97-06-14. 
61 Id. at http://www.tera.ca/index.html#Purpose.  
62 GOTOPLESS.ORG, http://gotopless.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). Although GoTopless claims 
to be motivated by notions of liberal equality—even invoking the Constitution on the front page of its 
website—at least one journalist has pointed out that the founder of GoTopless is also the spiritual leader of 
the Raelian Movement, which has been accused of cult-like activities. See Katy Kelleher, Go Topless 
Equality Movement Founded By Sketchy Cult Leader, JEZEBEL.COM (August 23, 2010), 
http://jezebel.com/5619500/go-topless-equality-movement-founded-by-sketchy-cult-leader. 
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The Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society, on the other hand, is not 
overtly political.  Instead, members of the group are simply trying to take advantage of New 
York’s topless equality.63  The organization is made up of mostly women, who read in public 
places around New York City while wearing no tops.64  By taking advantage of the law in a 
public way—they often document their meet-ups on a blog—they demonstrate that female breast 
equality is about more than theoretical debate; it implicates actual behavior.  
The fashion industry, too, has signaled a shift toward public female breast acceptance.  
For example, at the 2014 London Fashion Week, several designers showcased female garments 
that revealed the nipple.65  Sheer garments were the “leftfield trend,” with several collections 
“suggest[ing] that day-to-day nipple freedom might just be a hair’s breadth away.”66  
Protest actions, social organizations and even fashion trends are all indicators of shifts in 
society’s understanding of the public female breast.67  The recent wave of actions challenging 
female breast censorship suggests that public norms are expanding to make room for the public 
female breast.  The ubiquity of public and workplace breastfeeding,68 too, supports this 
                                                
63 See infra Part I.E.1; I.E.3. 
64 The Outdoor Co-ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society, 
http://coedtoplesspulpfiction.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
65 See Nathalie Olah, Why nipples were much more than just a trend at London Fashion Week, THEGUARDIAN.COM 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2014/sep/19/why-nipples-were-much-more-than-just-a-trend-
at-london-fashion-week. 
66 Id. Indeed, scholars pointed to fashion trends and advertising norms in 1999 that depicted the nude or nearly nude 
female breast. See DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 142 (“women often wear tops of thin or tight-fitting materials 
that reveal their nipples, albeit thinly covered by fabric, to the eyes of the public . . . [F]emale breasts that are 
uncovered or nearly uncovered are pervasive in advertising and entertainment media.”). See also 108 Ridiculously 
Naked Fall/Winter Outfits, COSMOPOLITAN.COM, http://www.cosmopolitan.com/style-
beauty/fashion/news/g4620/nakedest-runway-looks-nyfw-fall-2015/? (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“The biggest 
runway trend of fall 2015 is definitely nipples.”). 
67 Even some municipalities seem to be accepting the public female breast.  In 2012, San Francisco passed a public 
nudity ordinance, which only prohibited exposure of a person’s “genitals, perineum, or anal region,” but not breasts. 
S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE ORDINANCE § 154(b) (2012), available at 
http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/ordinances12/o0234-12.pdf.  
68 See supra note 52, and accompanying text; see generally Alexis Grant, What Women Should Know about 
Breastfeeding at Work, USNEWS.COM (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2011/02/15/what-women-should-know-about-breastfeeding-at-
work. 
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understanding.  These evolving societal standards play a central role in the constitutionality of 
female breast censorship, ultimately strengthening the argument to find such censorship laws 
unconstitutional.  
C. First Amendment Issues  
 
The First Amendment69 protects some instances of the public female breast, but is an 
insufficient shield for total female breast equality.  It is therefore important to understand the 
First Amendment’s role in female breast censorship cases to understand its limits.  
Governmental laws regulating the content of any speech—which includes actions that 
contain communicative messages70—are habitually challenged for infringing on the First 
Amendment. For example, in United States v. O'Brien, a defendant argued that burning a draft 
card was “symbolic speech” protected by the First Amendment.71 As another example, 
defendants who have been charged with an obscenity violation may base their defense on a 
constitutional argument alleging that the law in question violates the First Amendment.72 
Additionally, owners of sex-related businesses, like strip clubs and adult-themed stores, often use 
the First Amendment to challenge zoning laws that restrict their businesses to undesirable 
locations.73  Protesting a female breast censorship law by demonstrating topless in public is 
arguably speech and invokes the First Amendment.  In such instances, two First Amendment 
doctrines come into play: (1) the regulation of obscene speech, and (2) the regulation of 
expressive conduct. 
                                                
69 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
70 See Brown v. State, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966); see also Hightower v. City of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d 
867, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The First Amendment protects not only the expression of ideas through printed or 
spoken words, but also symbolic speech—nonverbal activity ... sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
71 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
72 See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
73 See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
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“[A]s a general matter, ... government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”74  But there are limited exceptions, 
including obscenity.75  Obscene speech is a category of unprotected speech that can be prevented 
and regulated.76  The modern test for whether material is obscene comes from Miller v. 
California.77  Generally, if the speech meets the three prongs of the Miller test, it is obscene and 
may be freely regulated.78  The test is:  
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.79 
Because of the last element, obscene speech with political value escapes the obscenity 
label.80  Not only that, but political speech occupies a special status in First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and is strongly protected against governmental regulation.81  Therefore, if public 
nudity is speech, it can likely avoid being categorized as obscene so long as it has political value. 
But is public nudity speech? The Supreme Court has noted, “Being ‘in a state of nudity’ 
is not an inherently expressive condition.”82  Lower courts have agreed.83 Accordingly, “[i]n 
                                                
74 Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
75 Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)). 
76 See id. at 2733–34; Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1380 (2008) 
(“If expression or conduct qualifies as obscenity, it is excluded from the First Amendment's protective reach.” 
(citations omitted)). 
77 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
78 See id. at 23–25.  
79 Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted). Ordinances or statutes concerning zoning of obscene material are also 
governed by Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).    
80 See, e.g., United States v. Various Articles of Merch., 230 F.3d 649, 658 (3d Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 15, 
2000) (finding nudist lifestyle “magazines qualify for First Amendment protection because of their political value.”). 
81 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our First 
Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political 
speech occupies the highest, most protected position.”). 
82 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion).  
83 See e.g., Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-12-5841 EMC, 2013 WL 361115, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 29, 2013) (citing South Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir.1984) (“nudity is 
protected as speech only when combined with some mode of expression which itself is entitled to first amendment 
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deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the 
First Amendment into play, [the Court has] asked whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized 
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”84 
Ongoing litigation in San Francisco is illustrative. In Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San 
Francisco, two plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit “alleging that the enforcement of a San 
Francisco ordinance that bars nudity on, e.g., public streets and sidewalks violates their First 
Amendment rights.”85 The plaintiffs had protested the ordinance by appearing nude in public.86 
At least twice, they were issued citations and taken into custody.87 
The first question the court addressed was whether the plaintiffs’ nudity was speech such 
that it received First Amendment protection. The court identified the two-part test (intent to 
convey a message, and likelihood it would be understood), and applied it to multiple instances of 
the plaintiffs protesting in the nude.88 In a fact-intensive decision, the court found that in some 
instances, the nudity constituted expressive speech, and in others it did not.89 If nudity is 
expressive speech, it is more difficult for the government to regulate.90 
As can be seen, the First Amendment is not a complete shield against all female breast 
censorship laws.  For instance, topless sunbathing would be unlikely to receive First Amendment 
protection, either due to such conduct being labeled obscene, or due to a finding that it is not 
expressive conduct.  Protesting a public nudity law by exposing one’s breasts, however, is 
                                                                                                                                                       
protection.”)); see also State v. Turner, 382 N.W.2d 252, 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (“The Minnesota Supreme 
Court has held that ‘nudity is not protected expression, but conduct, which the city has a substantial interest in 
regulating via its police power.’” (citation omitted)).  
84 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quotation omitted). 
85 Hightower v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 77 F. Supp. 3d 867, 872 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
86 See id. at 873.  
87 See id.  
88 See id. at 876.  
89 See generally id. at 877–87.  
90 See id. at 880–81 (discussing and applying the O’Brien test for government regulation of expressive conduct). 
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conceivably protected, because the conduct—nudity—conveys a political message.91  This likely 
protection provides support for the argument that breast censorship laws fail the intermediate 
scrutiny test, as will be further described in Part III. 
D. Equal Protection Clause Doctrine for Classifications Based on Sex 
 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that, “No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”92  
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to require that laws that classify on the basis of 
sex satisfy intermediate scrutiny.  For the law to be deemed valid under this standard, the 
classification must serve an “important governmental objective[] and . . . the discriminatory 
means employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of [that] objective[].”93  
 The Court’s jurisprudence on the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to sex has evolved 
greatly, albeit clumsily, since its origins in Reed v. Reed.94  In Reed, the mother and father of a 
decedent both sought to control administration of his estate.95  The father was chosen based on 
an Idaho statute that required the male to be chosen over the female if both parents were equally 
qualified.96  Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous 
Court, declared the statute’s preference for males to be “arbitrary” and one that could not “stand 
                                                
91 See Tagami v. City of Chicago, No. 14 CV 9074, 2015 WL 4187209, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2015) (holding 
that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a First Amendment claim against an indecency ordinance “when she appeared 
in public wearing opaque body paint covering her otherwise bare chest during a GoTopless Day [female topless 
protest] event.”); see also Moriber, supra note 12, at 455 (“If a woman is engaged in unassociated nudity, or nudity 
that is not intertwined with ‘speech’ or a ‘message’ separate from the nudity, the nudity is mere conduct and is not 
entitled to First Amendment Protection.  If, however, the nudity is not ‘nudity for nudity's sake’ and is associated 
with speech as part of a specific message, it will likely fall under the protections of the First Amendment . . . 
Ironically, because protesting is highly valued and generally protected as political speech, when women are 
protesting topless bans, their specific expression will likely be permissible.”). 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.  The Equal Protection Clause has also been reverse incorporated into the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, so as to apply to federal government action in addition to state government 
action. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
93 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
94 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
95 See id. at 71–72. 
96 See id. at 71–73. 
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in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State deny the equal protection of 
the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.”97  The Court thus struck down a sex-based 
distinction under a standard that resembled rational basis review. 
 Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court went much further and declared 
that classifications on the basis of sex were “inherently suspect” and subject to strict scrutiny 
judicial review.98  In Frontiero, a female Air Force member challenged a federal law that 
required her to prove her husband was in fact dependent on her in order to receive certain 
benefits, although a man could claim his wife as a dependent without any such proof.99  The 
Court held that a law that accorded “differential treatment to male and female members of the 
uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . violate[d] 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”100  Importantly, the Court recognized the 
nation’s “long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,” based on ideas of romantic 
paternalism, that “in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”101 
 Yet, strict scrutiny review for sex-based classifications did not last.  In Craig v. Boren, 
the Court held that laws with classifications based on sex would be subject to “elevated or 
‘intermediate’ level scrutiny.”102  In Boren, an Oklahoma statute prohibited a certain type of beer 
to be sold to males under the age of 21, but to females only under the age of 18.103  Despite an 
argument that the law was tailored to address traffic safety issues, the Court held that it 
                                                
97 Id. at 74. 
98 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (“With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that 
classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently 
suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying the analysis mandated by that stricter 
standard of review, it is clear that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally invalid.”). 
99 See id. at 678. 
100 Id. at 690–91. 
101 Id. at 684. 
102 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
103 See id. at 191–92 (majority opinion). 
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“invidiously discriminate[d] against males 18-20 years of age.”104  Thus, in the same case that 
the Court introduced the intermediate scrutiny test, it used it to strike down a law.  
In later cases, like Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,105 and United States v. 
Virginia,106 the Court clarified its intermediate scrutiny standard.  Now, “[t]he party seeking to 
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender must carry the burden of 
showing an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”107  That is, the sex-
based classification must have an important—or exceedingly persuasive—governmental 
objective, and the means must be substantially related to that objective.108 
E. Cases in which Breast Censorship Laws Held to Violate the Equal Protection Clause 
 
The intermediate scrutiny standard has since been applied to both uphold and strike down 
female breast censorship laws.  The following cases are some of the few in which judges struck 
down such laws after analyzing them under some version of the two-pronged intermediate 
scrutiny test.  These cases illustrate the types of analyses with which courts engage when 
resolving breast censorship challenges.  Ultimately, Part III builds on and augments the 
reasoning in the following cases in establishing that female breast censorship laws violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.   
1. People v. David 
 In 1989, Mary Lou Schloss and Romona Santorelli had a topless picnic at a public beach 
in Rochester, New York.109  Along with twenty to thirty other women, Schloss and Santorelli 
                                                
104 Id. at 204. 
105 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
106 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515.  
107 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724; see also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531. 
108 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. 
109 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 124. 
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“removed their shirts and swam, sunbathed, and played volleyball.”110  They were arrested for 
violating New York Penal Law section 245.01, 111 which read:  
A person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a manner 
that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For 
purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall 
include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section 
shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or 
performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.112 
The women were first convicted by a judge who upheld the constitutionality of the law, in part 
by relying on the biblical book of Genesis.113  The state appellate court, however, found the 
“statute's gender classification violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the [United States] and 
[New York State] Constitutions.”114   
The court based its holding on a straightforward application of a version of the current 
intermediate scrutiny test.  First, instead of asking whether the classification had an important 
governmental objective, the court asked whether “the statute protect[ed] a legitimate government 
interest.”115  The court’s entire analysis of this prong consisted of one sentence.  Relying on 
another New York state case, the court found that “protecting the public's sensibilities is a 
legitimate government interest.”116   
Next, instead of asking whether the means of sex-based classification were substantially 
related to that government objective—the “tailoring” prong of the analysis—the court asked 
whether “the gender-based classification [was] a reasonable means of achieving substantial 
                                                
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 People v. David, 152 Misc. 2d 66, 67 (Munroe Cnty. Ct. 1991) (quoting Penal Law § 245.01). 
113 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 124–25. 
114 David, 152 Misc. 2d at 68.  The court noted, however, that the statute could be “construed to be gender neutral 
and implicitly include in its prohibitions the exposure of a male's breast as violative of the statute where it is 
satisfactorily demonstrated that it constitutes ‘private or intimate parts’ of a person. Though an equal protection 
violation has been determined, the law does not require reversal of the conviction on that ground.” Id. 
115 Id. at 67. 
116 Id. 
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government ends and not merely the arbitrary classifying of people by sexual sterotypes [sic].”117  
This analysis is more deferential to the state than the current constitutional standard. This is 
because the New York court required only a reasonable relationship, rather than a substantial 
relationship, between the classification and the government purpose.  Moreover, the New York 
appellate court in this case interpreted reasonableness to mean “not merely. . . arbitrary,”118 
which lowers the threshold even further.  If, then, a law is still struck down as violating the Equal 
Protection Clause under this interpretation of the constitutional standard, it certainly would not 
have withstood scrutiny under the standard as it is known and applied today. 
In its tailoring analysis, the New York appellate court identified the government purpose 
as protecting public sensibilities. It therefore focused on whether there was something particular 
about the female breast that threatened public sensibilities.  The court’s primary analysis relied 
heavily on expert witnesses opining that “[m]ale and female breasts are physiologically similar 
except for lactation capability.”119  Given the similarities, the court concluded that the “gender 
based classification does not serve the legitimate governmental interest better than would a 
gender neutral law.”120  
Interestingly, the court went on to note that the experts also concluded that community 
standards had evolved to the point where female breasts were no longer considered a private or 
intimate body part.121 Although in the context of the remedy, this conclusion could be understood 
as another reason for finding that censoring the public female breast was not a reasonable way to 
protect public sensibilities.  First, public sensibilities do not need protection from a body part 
whose only sex-based distinction is lactation abilities.  Second, even if community norms are 
                                                
117 Id. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. at 68. 
120 Id.  
121 See David, 152 Misc. 2d at 68. 
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used, experts testified that the female breast is no longer understood as an intimate body part that 
needs to be shielded to protect the public.  The court could have also intended these two reasons 
as support for the same point: because the only physical difference between a female breast and a 
male breast is lactation ability, it is not an intimate body part, and its regulation is not reasonably 
related to protecting public sensibilities.  In any event, the New York appellate court in People v. 
David found that in 1991, public sensibilities did not require the censorship of female breasts.  
The gender classification was struck down.122  
2. Williams v. City of Fort Worth 
 In Williams v. City of Fort Worth,123 a nightclub owner alleged that a Fort Worth zoning 
ordinance was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.  One of those reasons was that the 
ordinance was an equal protection violation as it “only regulates exposure of female breasts but 
not male breasts and, therefore, unconstitutionally discriminates against female topless dancers 
and proprietors of clubs featuring female topless dancers.”124  The ordinance defined nudity as: 
“less than completely and opaquely covered: a) Human genitals, pubic region or pubic hair, b) 
Human buttock, c) Female breast or breasts below a point immediately above the top of the 
areola.”125  
After a lengthy analysis, the court held that the nudity portion of the ordinance violated 
the equal protection rights of female topless dancers.126  Importantly, the Texas appeals court in 
this case was not analyzing the ordinance under the United States Equal Protection Clause but 
                                                
122 Id. at 68 (“The statute can therefore be construed to be gender neutral and implicitly include in its prohibitions 
the exposure of a male's breast as violative of the statute where it is satisfactorily demonstrated that it constitutes 
“private or intimate parts” of a person.”). 
123 Williams v. City of Fort Worth, 782 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App. 1989), writ denied and writ withdrawn (Oct. 10, 
1990), disapproved of by Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting 
disapproval “to the extent [Williams] hold[s] that the Texas Equal Rights Amendment was intended to apply to an 
ordinance prohibiting female topless dancing in residential neighborhoods.”). 
124 Id. at 295. 
125 Id. at 292 (emphasis added). 
126 See id. at 298. 
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the Texas Equal Rights Amendment.  If a law is found to discriminate on the basis of sex in 
Texas, it “survive[s] strict judicial scrutiny ‘only if the proponent can prove that there is no other 
manner to protect the state's compelling interests.’”127  Unlike in People v. Davis, this is a higher 
standard of review than the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause doctrine demands.  
Nevertheless, under the court’s reasoning, the law could not survive the less strict intermediate 
scrutiny standard. 
In considering whether the law discriminated on the basis of sex, the court rejected two 
arguments commonly made by defenders of female breast censorship laws: real physical 
difference between male and female breasts and the eroticization of the female breast.  The City 
argued that the ordinance does not treat women differently because they are women, but only 
because their breasts are physically different from men’s breasts.128  The court, however, rejected 
the physical difference argument because the City failed to show why physical difference 
required different treatment under the statute.129  Next, amici curiae for the City argued that the 
ordinance merely regulates erogenous zones, which include the female breast, but not the male 
breast.130  The court first called into question the flimsy support the amici had cited, and then 
highlighted the inherently discriminatory perspective such justification would require the court to 
adopt:      
                                                
127 Id. at 296 (citation omitted). 
128 See id. 
129 See id. Although many courts rely on the physical difference between male and female breasts, the 
Williams court pointed out that real difference alone should not uphold a discriminatory law.  Scholar 
Hirczy de Mino maintains that the Williams decision “demonstrates a keener appreciation for the ease with 
which physical differences between men and women can serve to deny equal rights, and the need to look 
not only at whether a unique characteristic is present, but whether it is relevant to the discrimination.” 
Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino, Does an Equal Rights Amendment Make A Difference?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 
1581, 1603 (1997). See also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34 (“Sex classifications may be used to compensate 
women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal employment 
opportunity,’ to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people. But such 
classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women.” (internal citations omitted)). 
130 See Williams, 782 S.W.2d at 297. 
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Our court is not authorized . . . to take judicial notice of the concept that the 
breasts of female topless dancers, unlike their male counterparts, are commonly 
associated with sexual arousal. Such a viewpoint might be subject to reasonable 
dispute, depending on the sex and sexual orientation of the viewer.131 
After holding that the ordinance discriminated against women as women, the court found 
that the ordinance was not the only way to protect the City’s compelling interest of preventing 
secondary neighborhood effects, as the record contained no proof of a connection whatsoever.132  
As a result, the court struck down the nudity definition in the ordinance.133   
3. People v. Santorelli 
 People v. Santorelli, a case decided by New York’s highest state court, is a frequently 
cited case on the topic of female breast censorship.134  The facts underlying this case are similar 
to People v. David because the case involved the same defendants.  In June of 1986, Romona 
Santorelli and eight other women removed their tops in an expression of public disagreement 
with a New York law that criminalized the public exposure of the female, but not male, breast.135  
Seven women were arrested.136   
Despite the majority holding that the convictions for topless sunbathing were rightly 
dismissed in a court below,137 the concurring opinion is more often discussed.  This is because 
                                                
131 Id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 298.  Still, after rejecting using community standards in the case at hand, the court took care to note, 
“we are not discussing community standards for appropriate attire in public places where unwitting observers may 
be subject to offense, such as are governed by public lewdness statutes.” Id. Thus, the court set up a distinction 
between public female toplessness and private female toplessness based on the willingness of third parties to seeing 
female breasts. See id. 
134 See generally People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (N.Y. 1992). 
135 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 113.  
136 Id. 
137 See Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d at 877. 
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only the concurrence, not the five-paragraph majority opinion, engaged in Equal Protection 
Clause analysis.138   
The concurrence analyzed the case under the two-pronged intermediate scrutiny test 
associated with sex-based Equal Protection Clause challenges.139  Like in People v. David, the 
concurrence first identified the government interest as protection of public sensibilities.140  
Unlike in People v. David, however, the concurrence found this interest to be the source of the 
constitutional problem. 
[T]he concept of “public sensibility” itself, when used in these contexts, may be 
nothing more than a reflection of commonly held preconceptions and biases. One 
of the most important purposes to be served by the Equal Protection Clause is to 
ensure that “public sensibilities” grounded in prejudice and unexamined 
stereotypes do not become enshrined as part of the official policy of 
government.141  
 
The concurrence then described the danger that “public sensibilities” in this context are 
likely just a proxy for stereotypes.  First, “the female breast is no more or less a sexual organ 
than is the male equivalent.”142  Moreover, even though some may find the female breast arouses 
the prurient interests, such a perspective is itself “a suspect cultural artifact rooted in centuries of 
prejudice and bias toward women.”143  Without even addressing the tailoring aspect of the 
intermediate scrutiny inquiry, the concurrence concluded that the criminal statute violated the 
Equal Protection Clause based on the absence of an important governmental interest.144 
                                                
138 See Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d at 877 (Titone, J., concurring) (“Citing the maxim that wherever possible statutes 
should be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality, the [majority] bypass[ed] appellants' equal protection 
argument by holding that Penal Law § 245.01 simply does not apply ‘in these circumstances.’”). 
139 See id. at 880 (“When a statute explicitly establishes a classification based on gender, as Penal Law § 245.01 
unquestionably does, the State has the burden of showing that the classification is substantially related to the 
achievement of an important governmental objective.”). 
140 See id. at 880–81. 
141 Id. at 881. 
142 Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d at 881 (Titone, J., concurring) 
143 Id. at 882. 
144 See id. at 883. 
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II. THE COSTS OF CENSORSHIP 
 
Female breast censorship is normatively harmful.  First, it perpetuates heterosexual male 
definitions of eroticism, contributing to the sexual and political subjugation of women.  Second, 
it enforces dangerous body image issues.  Lastly, it deprives women of the choice to be 
comfortable.  This Part aims to show that there are normative grounds for objecting to female 
breast censorship laws.145  
A. Eroticism and the Subjugation of Women  
The eroticization of the female breast has perpetuated the subjugation of women.  Yet, 
the eroticism of female breasts is not a universally held belief.  In other cultures around the 
world, the female breast does not have an erotic meaning.146  This does not mean, however, that 
other body parts are not similarly sexualized.  Scholar Marilyn Yalom writes: 
Non-Western cultures have their own fetishes—small feet in China, the nape of 
the neck in Japan, the buttocks in Africa and the Caribbean.  In each instance, the 
sexually charged body part—what the French poet Mallarme refers to as ‘the 
veiled erotic’—owes much of its fascination to full or partial concealment.147   
 
One might thus conclude: the more public the body part, the less sexual the body part.  
Female breast censorship ensures concealment, which makes it more difficult for female breasts 
to shed their sexual character. 
 Eroticized body parts are not necessarily harmful.  However, when eroticized body parts 
develop into the eroticization of a class of people, there is a danger that the class’s sexuality 
overshadows other aspects of the class.  In the case of female breasts, the eroticization comes 
                                                
145 Additionally, the harms expounded upon in this Section refute the occasionally-made argument that the Equal 
Protection Clause is not implicated by female breast censorship in the first place, because the laws do not perpetuate 
women’s inferiority. See infra notes 209–212, and accompanying text.  
146 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 284 (specifically noting cultures in Africa and the South Pacific). But see 
Boso, supra note 2, at 152–53 (citing a Canadian case, R. v. Jacob, [1996] 112 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 15 (Can.), in 
which the judge convicted a woman for toplessness, citing that the female breast is “sexually stimulating to 
men.”). 
147 YALOM, supra note 16, at 3. 
 
 
27 
primarily from the heterosexual male point of view.148  As legal scholar Luke Boso points out, 
“[s]ociety . . . has carved out an exception to the general nonacceptance of female breast 
exposure: exposure to entertain or sexually arouse males.”149  This is evidenced in that “[w]omen 
are often free to expose their breasts at times and in places in which men desire it: at topless bars 
and clubs, in pornography, and in the bedroom.”150  Heterosexual male eroticization of the 
female breast, sanctioned by government laws that require its censorship when not in certain 
circumstances, threatens to—or perhaps continues to—subjugate women as a class, by 
objectifying women and dictating how, where, and why they may present their bodies.151        
The sexualization of the female breast emanating mainly from the heterosexual male 
viewpoint is important because, as Virginia Milstead has remarked, it “overlooks the perspective 
of women on the issue, and what women find erotic. It in fact overlooks the perspective of 
anyone who is not a heterosexual male.”152  In fact, some research has demonstrated that women 
find the male chest the most sexually stimulating body part.153  Moreover, male and female 
breasts are both capable of sexual arousal.154 
                                                
148 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 282.  (“In any case, the greater difficulty with the courts' conclusion that women's 
breasts are erogenous while men's are not is two-fold: first, the conclusion is based only on the perspective of 
heterosexual men; second, it assumes an inherent difference where one does not exist.”). Of course, people who are 
not heterosexual and male may find female breasts erotic, too, yet the historical eroticization of the female breast 
that helps explain female breast censorship laws came primarily from heterosexual males. See supra Parts I.A, B. 
149 Boso, supra note 2, at 147. 
150 Id. 
151 See Jessica Blankenship, The Social and Legal Arguments for Allowing Women to Go Topless in Public, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sep 18, 2013, 8:34 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/the-social-and-legal-
arguments-for-allowing-women-to-go-topless-in-public/279755/2/ (“Proponents of topless equality assert that laws 
that single out women are effectively perpetuating a degrading cultural norm towards sexualizing women’s bodies 
without their consent. The concern is that the laws incidentally support a larger mentality of objectifying women.”). 
152 Milstead, supra note 8, at 283 (citation omitted). 
153 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 282. 
154 See id. at 282–83; see generally Roy Levin & Cindy Meston, Nipple/Breast Stimulation and Sexual Arousal in 
Young Men and Women 3 JOURNAL OF SEXUAL MEDICINE, 450 (2006), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1743-6109.2006.00230.x/abstract (explaining conclusion of 
questionnaire-based study in article’s abstract, that “[m]anipulation of the nipples/breasts causes or enhances sexual 
arousal in approximately 82% of young women and 52% of young men with only 7–8% reporting that it decreased 
their arousal.”) 
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 The heterosexual male eroticization of the female breast has led to, or at least allowed 
for, the continued public censorship of the female breast.  Because female breasts are sexual to 
heterosexual males, they must be covered to avoid arousing men.155  This is problematic for two 
reasons: first, it requires women instead of men to be responsible for heterosexual men’s 
urges;156 and second, it restricts women based on other’s perception of them.157  Both of these 
problems enforce women’s subjugation, as the law requires women to cover up for men, and 
disregards women’s choices free from the male perspective.158   
B. Enforcement of Dangerous Body Image Issues 
 
Female breast censorship reinforces female breast eroticization.159  Female breast 
eroticization contributes to the general sexual objectification of women in relation to men.160  
Such objectification produces dangerous body image issues for women.161     
Society plays an important role in how individuals view themselves and their bodies.162  
One important societal factor that impacts body image is the way one imagines other people 
                                                
155 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 116 (“[T]he (heterosexual) male myth of a woman's breast has been codified into 
law. Because women are the sexual objects and property of men, it follows that what might arouse men can only be 
displayed when men want to be aroused.”). 
156 See id. at 135 (“This framework of protecting women from men shifts the burden of responsibility from men to 
women; because women provoke uncontrollable urges in males, society excuses male behavior and blames the 
victim for whatever happens . . . In many ways, the excitement for men in viewing women bare-breasted is rooted in 
the prohibition against public exposure.”); see also Boso, supra note, 2 at 149 (“[T]o the extent that society is 
concerned about heterosexual males' harmful response to female toplessness, shifting the burden to women to 
prevent male behavior is a biased and inequitable solution.”). 
157 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 116–117; see also Libby S. Adler, A Short Essay on the Baring of Breasts, 
23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (2000) (explaining that censoring the female breast in turn censors female expressions 
of victory, protest and aggression); see also Moriber, supra note 12, at 459 (to some women, “a prohibition on 
making the individual choice to go top-free symbolizes an inability to shed the remnants of subordination and be 
liberated, as men are.”). 
158 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 283 (“Aside from this view being distinctly androcentric, and accordingly a view 
that contributes to women's political and social marginalization, it is bad law. It is bad law to claim that a proposition 
is “indisputable” when it has only considered the perspectives of less than half the population.” (citations omitted)); 
see also Glazer, supra note 50, at 114–116. 
159 See supra Part II.A. 
160 See Martin S. Weinberg & Colin J. Williams, Bare Bodies: Nudity, Gender, and the Looking Glass Body, 
25 SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 47, 48 (March 2010) ("Sexual objectification occurs when a woman's sexual parts or 
functions are separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere instruments, or else regarded as if they 
were capable of representing her." (quoting Bartky)). 
161 See id. 
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perceive their body.163  The law helps mold such perceptions.164  For example, if concealment of 
a body part contributes to the body part’s sexuality, a law mandating concealment perpetuates 
the body part’s sexuality.165 This is the case with female breasts and female breast censorship 
laws.  As discussed, these laws can lead to eroticization and objectification of women.166 
Unsurprisingly, feelings of objectification can lead to body shame and anxiety.167 
Women are already more likely than men to have body image issues.168  Body image 
issues can lead to a variety of serious physical and mental impairments, like eating disorders, 
depression, anxiety, and suicidality, among others.169  Feelings of objectification have been 
specifically linked to higher rates of depression and eating disorders.170   
                                                                                                                                                       
162 See NATIONAL EATING DISORDERS ASSOCIATION, Media, Body Image, and Eating Disorders, 
https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/media-body-image-and-eating-disorders (discussing the significant 
influence that media has on body image); see also Kate Fox, Mirror, mirror, A summary of research 
findings on body image, SOCIAL ISSUES RESEARCH CENTRE (1997), http://www.sirc.org/publik/mirror.html 
(noting effects of media depictions of beauty ideals). Studies have also found that the media has a profound 
effect on women’s acceptance of their own bodies and what the ideal female body looks like. See generally 
Martin Eisend & Jana Möller, The Influence of TV Viewing on Consumers' Body Images and Related 
Consumption Behavior, 18 MARKETING LETTERS, 101, 101 (2006). 
163 See Weinberg & Williams, supra note 160, at 48. 
164 See Glazer, supra note 50, at 115 (arguing that “the law has contributed to the creation of an 
environment in which women are conditioned to hate their bodies and strive for an unrealistic and 
unattainable ideal form.”). 
165 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. But see Peter Anderson, Rose E. Frisch, et al., The 
Reproductive Role of the Human Breast [and Comments and Reply], 24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, 25, 26 
(1983) (“There appears to be no relationship between whether the breasts are normally bared or concealed 
by clothing and their erotic significance, although in societies that prefer women to keep their breasts 
covered this is usually restricted to the period between puberty and the birth of the first child.”). 
166 See supra Part II.A. 
167 See Weinberg & Williams, supra note 160, at 48. 
168 See generally, Glazer, supra note 50, at 114–15; Alan Feingold & Ronald Mazzella, Gender Differences 
in Body Image Are Increasing, 9 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 190, 190–93 (May 1998) (meta-analysis from 
second half of twentieth century noting women’s body dissatisfaction over time, and that “males are more 
satisfied with their bodies than females.”); see also Fox, supra note 162 (“All research to date on body 
image shows that women are much more critical of their appearance than men.”); NATIONAL EATING 
DISORDERS ASSOCIATION, Research on Males and Eating Disorders, 
https://www.nationaleatingdisorders.org/statistics-males-and-eating-disorders (citing a 2011 study that 
found “female-to-male ratio [of positive screens for eating disorders] was 3-to-1.”).  But see Denis 
Campbell, Body image concerns more men than women, research finds, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012, 7:05 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2012/jan/06/body-image-concerns-men-more-than-women 
(describing a British study that showed males have significant anxiety about body image). 
169 See Negative Body Image Related To Depression, Anxiety And Suicidality, SCIENCEDAILY (June 6, 
2006), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/06/060606224541.htm (“Adolescents with negative body 
image concerns are more likely to be depressed, anxious, and suicidal than those without intense 
 
 
30 
The law should be careful not to perpetuate dangerous body image issues, given the 
seriousness of its effects, especially on women.  But female breast censorship laws do just that.  
They reinforce female breast eroticization, which can lead to objectification, which in turn 
produces body image issues. 
C. Deprivation of Comfort   
 
Finally, the right for women to bare their breasts publically allows women the choice to 
be comfortable.  Female breast censorship deprives women of that choice.  Naturally, being 
topless in public may not be desirable in all places, at all times, for all people.  Men tend to enjoy 
this option of undress during warm weather, in places like beaches, parks, and festivals.  Social 
stigma and restrictive laws aside, some women would also likely enjoy being able to go without 
tops in such situations.171  Currently, however, for women to do so, they not only face the fear of 
law, but also harassment.  
That women are harassed when they breast-feed in public is indicative of the problem.172  
Even women who are using their breasts to fulfill a biological purpose are subjected to unwanted 
                                                                                                                                                       
dissatisfaction over their appearance.”); See also Body Image and Health - 2002. Revised 2009, 
AUSTRALIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (Apr. 26, 2009), https://ama.com.au/position-statement/body-image-
and-health-2002-revised-2009. 
170 Weinberg & Williams, supra note 160, at 50. 
171 See CAROLYN LATTEIER, BREASTS: THE WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVE ON AN AMERICAN OBSESSION, 161 
(1998) (recounting an incident with Kayla Sosnow, arrested for being topless in 1996 in the Osceola 
National Forest, who was topless because the temperature was ninety degrees and it felt more natural and 
comfortable); Morwenna Ferrier, The real reason French women have stopped sunbathing topless, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 28, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/fashion/fashion-blog/2014/jul/28/real-
reason-french-women-have-stopped-sunbathing-topless (reporting on France’s history of topless 
sunbathing, including French women’s comfort with it, but discussing other factors that have led to its 
decline, like health concerns, the “Americanisation” of women as sexual beings, and nude breasts being 
used for protest).  
172 See, e.g., Liz Lohuis, Breastfeeding mom says she was harassed, store apologizes, WYFF4.COM (Jul. 8, 
2014, 6:46 AM), http://www.wyff4.com/news/breastfeeding-mom-says-she-was-harassed-store-
apologizes/26835128 (woman breastfeeding in North Carolina store harassed); see also Katy George, 
Busting Out: The Right to Bare It All, ETHOS MAGAZINE (Sept. 26, 2010), 
http://ethosmagonline.com/busting-out-the-right-to-bear-all/ (“American attitudes toward naked breasts 
play a large role in persuading women to make the switch to formula, as discrimination against and 
harassment of nursing women are all too common despite numerous state laws allowing public 
breastfeeding.”) 
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attention.  Indeed, several states have carved out breast-feeding exceptions for laws that 
otherwise censor the female breast.173 Ultimately, eliminating female breast censorship laws 
altogether would better protect breast-feeding women.174   
This understanding depends on a certain logical chain.  Breast censorship laws encourage 
society’s understanding of the female breast as sexual; because the female breast is sexualized, 
the public female breast is seen as inappropriate and can result in harassment.  Accordingly, 
abolishing breast censorship laws will reduce the sexualization of the female breast, allowing 
women to bare their breasts without fear of harassment.  Of course, abolition of breast censorship 
laws alone is insufficient.  Women must also be willing to take advantage of the legal choice to 
be topless.  Groups like the Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society in New 
York, where female toplessness is legal, demonstrate that some women are so willing. 
Only when women begin to bare their breasts publically in the same manner as men—
which would result more quickly without censorship laws—will public female breasts become a 
“non-event.”175  At that point, harassment will no longer be a barrier to a woman’s choice to be 
comfortable.  
III. FEMALE BREAST CENSORSHIP VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSE 
 
 The censorship of the public female breast, but not the public male breast, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  A law that regulates the female breast 
                                                
173 See supra note 52.  
174 See George, supra note 172 (“Topfree advocates say the hyper-sexualization of women’s chests has only harmed 
society. By hiding breasts, American culture has made them an enticing taboo and encouraged both males and 
females to consider them nothing more than aesthetic ornaments, ignoring their true function as sources of food for 
infants.”). 
175 See Sunday's 'GoTopless Pride Parade' to end at Brooklyn's new boob-themed bar, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 23, 
2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/sundays-gotopless-pride-parade-to-end-at-brooklyns-new-boob-
themed-bar-272425541.html (“‘We hope that by participating in annual topless festivities, New York City women 
and women around the world will feel increasingly comfortable to go topless in public,’ [Rachel] Jessee [GoTopless 
Spokesperson] said. ‘When a woman's uncovered chest in public becomes the simple non-event it already is for a 
man, we will have accomplished our mission.’”) 
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applies only to members of one sex, patently denying “the equal protection of the laws” between 
the two sexes.   
This Part responds to commonly-cited reasons that courts use to deny Equal Protection 
Clause challenges by analyzing female breast censorship laws under the two-pronged 
intermediate scrutiny standard required by the Supreme Court.  First, this Part argues that based 
on current societal norms, there is no important governmental interest to justify female breast 
censorship.  Second, even if an important governmental interest exists, the sex-based 
classification is not substantially related to that interest.  A proper means analysis results in 
substantial overinclusivness and underinclusivness.  Finally, this Part turns to the recent Supreme 
Court cases United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges, which contain additional support 
for Equal Protection Clause challenges to female breast censorship. 
Although a handful of courts have already found Equal Protection Clause violations, 
most courts have upheld these facially discriminatory laws by relying on improper Equal 
Protection Clause analyses and outdated societal norms.  Importantly, if a court faces such a 
challenge today, it is insufficient to simply rely on one line of cases or the other.  Instead, the 
court must properly account for evidence of modern public norms—at least when the 
government advances the interest of protecting public sensibilities.  
A. No Important Governmental Objective 
 
Analyzing female breast censorship laws under an intermediate scrutiny standard, as 
doctrine demands, demonstrates that such laws do not pass constitutional muster.  First, the sex-
based classification must have an important governmental objective.  Indeed, the classification 
must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”176   
                                                
176 Miss Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (citation omitted); see also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.  
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Proponents of female breast censorship laws have offered a variety of supposed important 
governmental objectives for upholding such censorship, including preventing riots,177 shielding 
children, and protecting women from assault.178  More commonly, courts cite protecting public 
sensibilities as the important governmental objective that satisfies this prong of the analysis.179  
The changing understanding of the public female breast, however, undermines this justification.  
The protection of public sensibilities is far from “exceedingly persuasive.”  
 “Public sensibilities” is an amorphous and subjective concept.  As a result, courts that 
invoke it generally attempt to make it more concrete by relying on two lines of support: 
community standards and the doctrine of real difference.180  Given shifting societal norms, both 
justifications fall short. 
1. Modern Community Standards Do Not Require Breast Censorship  
 
In People v. Craft, the court explained that the governmental objective was “to protect the 
general public from being accosted by offensive conduct in public places,” which included 
women baring their breasts.181  The court attempted to justify this “public sensibilities” argument 
by stating that New York’s police power includes the ability to prohibit public nudity.182  But 
this statement merely kicked the question down the road—why are only bare female breasts 
                                                
177 See DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 143–45 (discussing convictions invoking this rationale and disputing its 
veracity). 
178 See Boso, supra note 2, at 148 (arguing such claims are disingenuous); DeJong & Smith, supra note 10, at 145–
46. 
179 See, e.g., United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1991) (important government interest is 
“protecting the moral sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be exposed willy-
nilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens' anatomies that traditionally in this society have 
been regarded as erogenous zones.”); State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
180 Real difference and community norms are not always mutually exclusive lines of reasoning. See Milstead, supra 
note 8, at 277 (“While claiming that the laws are based on physical differences, the courts nevertheless reveal that 
their main concern is how the public perceives female breasts.”). 
181 People v. Craft, 134 Misc. 2d 121, 124, (NY City Ct. 1986) rev'd, 149 Misc. 2d 223 (NY Co. Ct. 1991) rev'd sub 
nom. People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875 (1992).  Even though this case was ultimately reversed, the court’s 
reasoning provides relevant insight into how courts justify facially discriminatory breast censorship laws in the face 
of Equal Protection Clause challenges. 
182 Craft, 134 Misc. 2d at 124. 
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subject to nudity regulation, although bare male breasts are not?  The court ultimately answered 
that, “community standards, as perceived by the Legislature, regard the female breast as an 
intimate part of the human body.”183   
The court’s justification is exceedingly unpersuasive for two reasons. First, community 
standards no longer understand the female breast as an intimate body part that requires 
covering.184  But, even if a legislature regarded the female breast as intimate, the legislature’s 
finding is not the unreviewable final word on what constitutes an intimate part of the human 
body, such that it can freely regulate that body part even if regulations differ between the sexes.  
At that point, the Equal Protection Clause comes into play and courts have a role in determining 
the law’s constitutionality. 
 Initially, that female breasts were an intimate body part by societal standards in 1986, the 
year People v. Craft was decided, can be disputed.185  But even if they were, the 1986 
community standard is not the yardstick by which to measure community standards today.186  
Community standards have evolved greatly in the past twenty-nine years.187  The existence of 
organizations like the Outdoor Co-Ed Topless Pulp Fiction Appreciation Society, Free the 
Nipple, and GoTopless, among others discussed in Part I, demonstrates that the community 
                                                
183 Id. at 125. 
184 Helen Pundurs, Comment, Public Exposure of the Female Breast: Obscene and Immoral or Free and Equal?, 
14 IN PUB. INT. 1, 32 (1995) (“[C]ommunity standards are not an immutable entity, especially regarding moral 
values and acceptable behavior.”). It should also be noted that some courts refuse to even engage in the analysis of 
whether societal norms are changing, and if so, whether those changes affect the justification of protecting public 
sensibilities.  See Milstead, supra note 8, at 288–89 (citing cases in which courts considered changing social norms 
arguments to be irrelevant, noting “[m]any courts do not independently review the question of whether a difference 
in standards exists; they merely rely on the courts that came before them,” and arguing why such judicial abdication 
is harmful). 
185 Indeed, in Craft the defendants argued that “the government interest [of protecting public sensibilities] is 
illegitimate because it is based on stereotyped and archaic notions of the female breasts as objects for sexual 
pleasure.” Craft, 134 Misc. 2d at 125. 
186 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 291–92 (discussing how an intermediate scrutiny analysis should be conducted, 
and noting that one court “acknowledged that ‘nudity is a social concept, a changing social perception.’” (citation 
omitted)); cf. id. at 289 (“[T]he law supposes that standards of decency vary from community to community.” 
(citation omitted)). 
187 See supra Part I.B.  
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standard has begun to embrace the public female breast as being no different than the public 
male breast.  Despite female breast censorship laws, and despite some members of society still 
clinging to the view that the female breast is uniquely erotic, women are demanding to go 
topless.188   
One could argue that these acts of resistance are coming from a minority of citizens, and 
thus do not represent modern norms.  But this argument assumes that the majority of citizens 
who have not engaged with these issues are actively for female breast censorship.  The 
assumption is erroneous.  At best, the majority of citizens appears neutral on the issue.  If not, 
one would expect to find incidents of groups protesting to enforce female breast censorship laws, 
or counter-protesting female topless demonstrations, for example.189  Even aside from groups 
devoted to equal topless rights for women, current fashion trends are evidence of a community 
standard that has begun to accept the public female breast.190  Moreover, at least one recent 
nudity statute in a large municipality allows the display of male and female breasts alike.191  
Female breast censorship only makes sense from a historically-entrenched heterosexual male 
point of view, which understands the female breast as primarily erotic.192   
 Second, if protecting public sensibilities, as defined by community standards, can be 
deemed an important governmental interest in the Equal Protection Clause analysis, then those 
                                                
188 See supra notes 53–64, and accompanying text; see also Moriber, supra note 12, at 478 (“In the summer of 2008, 
when the group GoTopless conducted a topless demonstration on Lincoln Road, a commercial and social center in 
Miami Beach, there were no arrests. Instead, the group only drew a modest crowd of onlookers.” (citations 
omitted)). 
189 This author is aware of no publicity surrounding topless demonstrations that has reported on such incidents. 
190 See supra notes 65–66, and accompanying text. 
191 See supra note 67. 
192 See People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875, 881–82 (1992) (Titone, J., concurring) (“They further contend that to the 
extent that many in our society may regard the uncovered female breast with a prurient interest that is not similarly 
aroused by the male equivalent, that perception cannot serve as a justification for differential treatment because it is 
itself a suspect cultural artifact rooted in centuries of prejudice and bias toward women. Indeed, there are many 
societies in other parts of the world—and even many locales within the United States—where the exposure of 
female breasts on beaches and in other recreational area is commonplace and is generally regarded as 
unremarkable.” (internal citations omitted)); see also, supra Part II.A. 
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standards should not be defined by the legislature alone.  If permissible, then laws that classify 
on the basis of sex can always overcome the first prong of judicial review as long as the 
legislature declares the classification to be based on community standards.  Unless courts wish to 
relinquish their power of judicial review—at least in regards to the first prong of the intermediate 
scrutiny inquiry—they must measure community standards by more than a law’s passage in the 
legislature.  
Furthermore, recall that a woman who exposes her breasts to communicate political 
disagreement with breast censorship laws is probably protected under the First Amendment.193 
The likely legality of this conduct illustrates that protecting public sensibilities is actually an 
impermissible pretense for perpetuating a stereotype that harms women. In the context of protest, 
the public female breast is acceptable; but in the context of sunbathing, the public female breast 
is not. Thus, the purpose for which a woman reveals her breasts could be determinative of the 
legality of her action. That is, she might be allowed to bare her breasts in protest protected by the 
First Amendment, but not allowed to bare her breasts for comfort protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause. If this is the case, then either protecting public sensitivities is a sham 
governmental interest (as evidenced by it only mattering in certain contexts), or, the individual 
right to political expression outweighs the interest in public sensitivities.  In both cases, the 
inconsistent application of the law reveals the deep flaw in the justification of protecting public 
sensibilities. 
2. Real Difference Justification as Stereotypes in Disguise  
 
Courts also try to bolster the public sensibilities justification by claiming that female 
breasts and male breasts are physically different, and it is the difference of the female breast that 
would offend the public, which allows for its censorship.  In Craft v. Hodel, plaintiffs challenged 
                                                
193 See supra note 91, and accompanying text. 
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a National Park Service regulation that barred public nudity, defined as: “a person's intentional 
failure to cover with a fully opaque covering that person's own genitals, pubic areas, rectal area, 
or female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola when in a public 
place.”194  
 The district court upheld the statute in the face of an Equal Protection Clause challenge, 
based on the important governmental interest of protecting public sensibilities as they relate to 
the real difference between male and female breasts.195  Quoting from People v. Craft, the court 
found that the important governmental interest “is to protect the public from invasions of its 
sensibilities, and merely reflects current community standards as to what constitutes nudity.”196  
But the Hodel court went one step further in trying to reify “community standards.”  The nudity 
regulation was not about stereotypes, the court insisted, but was based on recognition of “a 
physical difference between the sexes which has implications for the moral and aesthetic 
sensitivities of a substantial majority of the country.”197  Similarly, a New Jersey appellate court 
agreed that, “[p]rotecting the public sensibilities is an important governmental interest based on 
an indisputable difference between the sexes.”198 
 There are two doctrinal difficulties with a court’s injection of “physical difference” into 
breast censorship Equal Protection Clause analysis.  First, an announcement of “real difference” 
is often impermissibly used as an excuse to bypass the first prong of the two-step intermediate 
scrutiny inquiry.  Second, the existence of real difference adds nothing to the argument that the 
protection of public sensibilities is an important government interest.  
                                                
194 Craft v. Hodel, 683 F. Supp. 289, 290 n. 1 (D. Mass. 1988) (citation omitted). 
195 See id. at 299–301.  
196 Id. at 299. 
197 Id. at 300. 
198 State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
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 Courts sometimes begin their analysis of breast censorship cases by invoking the real 
difference between male and female breasts.  These courts claim that, “the difference is 
biological.”199 Initially, these courts are correct: female breasts are biologically different from 
male breasts in their lactation abilities.  The problem is that too often courts stop at this point, 
and declare the real difference between female and male breasts as justifying the regulation of 
the female breast.  
J & B Social Club No. 1, Inc. v. City of Mobile is instructive.200  In J & B Social Club, the 
Mobile, Alabama City Council enacted an ordinance that banned females, but not males, from 
dancing topless in bars.201  Despite the ordinance classifying on the basis of sex, which is a 
suspect class that triggers intermediate scrutiny review, the court refused to apply an Equal 
Protection Clause analysis.  “It is apparent to the naked eye, and this court takes judicial notice, 
that female breasts are quite often different from male ones,” the court asserted.202  “In this 
regard, men and women are not ‘similarly situated,’ and the ordinance therefore raises no 
impermissible gender classification.”203  Such an approach impermissibly bypasses the entire 
intermediate scrutiny analysis based on the court’s judicial notice that there is a difference 
between male and female breasts.  Upon finding this real physical difference, the rest of the 
court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis includes the following: “Assuming, however, that such 
a distinction is ‘gender-based’ for equal protection purposes, the court finds that the distinction is 
substantially related to an important governmental interest.”204   
                                                
199 Milstead, supra note 8, at 279. 
200 See generally J & B Social Club No. 1, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 966 F.Supp. 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1996). 
201 See id. at 1133–34. 
202 Id. at 1139. 
203 Id.   
204 J & B Soc. Club No. 1, 966 F.Supp. at 1139. It then cited three cases with no further analysis. Id. 
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 Like in J & B Social Club, sometimes courts frame the analysis in terms of men and  
women being “similarly situated” or not. But, as legal scholar Giovanna Shay argues:  
properly understood, ‘similarly situated’ is not a threshold hurdle to equal 
protection analysis on the merits in cases involving facial classifications . . . . In 
cases regarding express categories, no matter the level of equal protection scrutiny 
applied, the focus of the “similarly situated” analysis is substantially the same as 
the key inquiry of equal protection review: Does the legislative classification bear 
a close enough relationship to the purpose of the statute?205 
 
In City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, a New Mexico appellate court was tasked with 
analyzing whether an Albuquerque ordinance barring public nudity violated the New Mexico 
Equal Rights Amendment for prohibiting the public display of female breasts “without a fully 
opaque covering of [the] entire nipple,” but not male breasts.206  Yet, the court improperly 
bypassed a substantive analysis upon finding a physical difference between male and female 
breasts.207  As Judge Linda M. Vanzi explained, the court “used a biological difference to justify 
a social stereotype. Notwithstanding documentary evidence that there is no inherent, significant 
difference between men's and women's breasts, it appears that the court was primarily concerned 
not with whether there is a difference but rather with societal norms.”208  
In yet another example of improperly bypassing the intermediate scrutiny analysis, the 
court in Tagami v. City of Chicago found that the plaintiff, who was challenging a Chicago 
indecent exposure ordinance, failed to state an Equal Protection Clause claim.209 The court 
found, “while the Ordinance permits men but not women to appear bare-chested in public, 
Tagami fails to allege how this distinction places ‘artificial constraints’ on a woman's 
opportunity, or how the [Ordinance] is used to ‘create or perpetuate the legal, social, and 
                                                
205 Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 581, 588 (2011). 
206 City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 92 P.3d 24, 25 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). 
207 See id. at 27 (rejecting Defendants’ call for strict scrutiny review, “agree[ing] with the district court's approach 
and hold[ing] that the classification in the City Ordinance is properly based on a unique characteristic.”). 
208 Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home Revisited: The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment After New Mexico 
Right to Choose/naral v. Johnson, 40 N.M. L. REV. 215, 222 (2010). 
209 See Tagami v. City of Chicago, No. 14 CV 9074, 2015 WL 4187209, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2015). 
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economic inferiority of women.’”210 Not only is such a showing not required,211 but in fact the 
sex-discriminatory ordinance does perpetuate the social inferiority of women.212 
 Courts commonly invoke real difference in an attempt to bolster the public sensitivities 
argument, even though the real differences between male and female breasts do not make female 
breasts more in need of shielding.  The biological difference, after all, is lactation ability, and 
most states have exceptions to public nudity and obscenity laws for breast-feeding mothers.213  If 
the real difference is the justification for protecting sensibilities, then why is a demonstration of 
that real difference—breastfeeding—specifically allowed in full display of the public?214  In 
actuality, a court’s determination of real difference between male and female breasts is used to 
impermissibly justify discriminatory stereotypes.215 
 In analyzing a law under the Equal Protection Clause, courts must ensure the important 
governmental interest is not actually enforcing a stereotype.  The need to root out laws that 
classify based on gender stereotypes is one reason women were deemed a suspect class in the 
first place.216  In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court instructed: 
[T]he test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is 
straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and 
abilities of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the 
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. 217 
                                                
210 Id. (citations omitted). 
211 See Shay, supra note 205, and accompanying text. 
212 See supra Part II.A. 
213 See supra note 52. 
214 See Moriber, supra note 12, at 461 (“By enacting these statutes, state legislatures are implicitly recognizing that 
the female breast is functionally different, but that its exposure in a nonsexual manner is not offensive or indecent.”).  
215 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 279 (arguing “that courts view the breast from a distinctly heterosexual male 
perspective, and from this perspective they conclude there is a real difference between men and women.”) 
216 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (“[O]ur statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped 
distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our 
society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”). 
217 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724–25. 
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 Courts that invoke real difference as further justification for protecting public sensibilities 
defy this command.218  This is because such invocations are revealed to be no more than social 
constructions based on stereotypes.  The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Biocic essentially 
admits this to be true.  It identified the important governmental interest as “protecting the moral 
sensibilities of that substantial segment of society that still does not want to be exposed willy-
nilly to public displays of various portions of their fellow citizens' anatomies that traditionally in 
this society have been regarded as erogenous,” which include the female breast.219   
 Yet, research and physiological realities challenge the veracity of the claim that female 
breasts are erogenous, while male breasts are not.220  This real difference, then, is no more than a 
stereotype in disguise.  As previously explained, the claim that female breasts must be censored 
to protect the public is a primarily heterosexual male viewpoint, based on the sexualization of 
female breasts.  From this understanding, the objective of protecting the public mores reflects an 
impermissible “archaic and stereotypic notion[].”221      
B. Means Not Substantially Related 
 
Even if the protection of public sensibilities was deemed an important governmental 
interest, female breast censorship laws are not substantially related to that objective.  Society’s 
understanding of the breast has evolved to the point that the public female breast would not lead 
to an erosion of public sensibilities.  Moreover, female breast censorship laws are both 
underinclusive and overinclusive to the governmental goal, which signals that the laws should 
fail the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis.     
                                                
218 See People v. Santorelli, 80 N.Y.2d 875, 881 (1992) (Titone, J., concurring) (protecting public 
sensibilities “is a tenuous basis for justifying a legislative classification that is based on gender, race or any 
other grouping that is associated with a history of social prejudice . . . Indeed, the concept of ‘public 
sensibility’ itself, when used in these contexts, may be nothing more than a reflection of commonly held 
preconceptions and biases.” (citations omitted)). 
219 Biocic, 928 F.2d at 115–16. 
220 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 282 (citation omitted); see also Cusack, supra note 10, at 201–03. 
221 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725. 
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Almost a quarter of a century has passed since a New York appellate court found that 
public sensibilities did not require the censorship of female breasts.222  Given the majority of 
cases that hold otherwise, however, one may fairly argue that the court’s conclusion in People v. 
David was an anomaly.  Even if that is the case, new evidence shows that society’s 
understanding of the public female breast has evolved to the point that its public display is closer 
to a “non-event”223 than a universally offensive action.   
Several organizations have formed within the last twenty years to protest female breast 
censorship laws and provide legal aid to women facing issues related to female breast 
censorship.224  In New York, where it is legal for women to be topless, women are forming 
groups to take advantage of that right.225  Furthermore, the fashion industry has embraced the 
female breast, with 2014 designs from multiple designers featuring sheer and see-through tops 
for women.226  In 2015, there were 66 planned Go Topless Day actions, with over 30 planned in 
the United States, in which women protested female breast censorship by baring their breasts.227  
Celebrities are also voicing their support for female breast equality.228  Even though some may 
be surprised to see the female breast in public, surprise is not a reaction that requires protecting 
public sensibilities.  In light of how the modern public understands the female breast, one would 
                                                
222 See People v. David, 152 Misc. 2d 66 (Munroe Cnty. Ct. 1991). 
223 See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra Part I.B. 
225 See supra notes 63–64, and accompanying text. 
226 See Nika Mavrody, Free the Fashion Nipple: A Brief History of Runway Boobs, THE FASHION SPOT 
(June 25, 2014), http://www.thefashionspot.com/runway-news/420487-free-the-fashion-nipple-a-brief-
history-of-runway-boobs/#/slide/1 (discussing “nipple trend” of Spring 2014 fashion shows); see also notes 
65, 65 and accompanying text.  
227 GOTOPLESS DAY – AUG 23, 2015, GOTOPLESS.ORG, http://gotopless.org/gotopless-day (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2015). 
228 See Sean O'Connell, How Miley Cyrus Is Supporting The Topless-Rights Movie Free The Nipple, 
CINEMABLEND, http://www.cinemablend.com/new/How-Miley-Cyrus-Supporting-Topless-Rights-Movie-
Free-Nipple-68340.html (noting that in addition to Miley Cyrus, “Lena Dunham, Liv Tyler, Rihanna 
and Keira Knightley have all voiced support for the topless movement”). 
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be hard pressed to argue that female breast censorship is substantially related to protecting the 
modern public’s sensibilities. 
Furthermore, female breast censorship laws are both over- and underinclusive to the goal 
of protecting public sensibilities.  They are overinclusive because a growing segment of the 
public is simply not offended by the public female breast. They are underinclusive because 
public sensibilities might need protection from similarly offensive breasts that are currently 
legally allowed to be on display.  For example, some may take offense to seeing large male 
breasts or male breasts that look like female breasts.  Some may need protecting from the erotic 
male chest in general.229  More broadly, there are a plethora of human activities that people may 
find unwelcome, unattractive, or offensive in public, yet most such activities are not illegal.230 
Evidence of society’s understanding of the public female breast, as well as the 
overinclusive and underinclusive nature of female breast censorship laws, reveals that such laws 
are not substantially related to protecting public sensibilities.  They therefore cannot overcome 
the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test.   
C. Violation of Equal Protection Clause Principles  
 
Finally, recent Supreme Court precedent contains supplementary support for Equal 
Protection Clause challenges to female breast censorship.  United States v. Windsor231 and 
Obergefell v. Hodges232 suggest that Equal Protection Clause principles are violated by laws that 
impose a stigma and disapproval on a class of people, like breast censorship laws do to women.    
                                                
229 See supra notes 153–54, and accompanying text. 
230 See Milstead, supra note 8, at 293 (“If the goal is to preserve public decency, one wonders why more 
human practices are not the subject of criminalization. People are forced to witness ‘unusual hairstyles, 
unattractive dress, or politically offensive speech.’ . . . The reason none of these offensive practices is the 
subject of a law is that people understand that they come along with living in a populous society.” (citations 
omitted)). 
231 See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
232 See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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In U.S. v. Windsor, the Court struck down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a 
federal law that defined marriage as between one man and one woman.233  In striking down 
DOMA, the Court partially relied on the law’s violation of Equal Protection Clause principles.234 
Two years later in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held that same-sex couples have a 
fundamental right to marry.235 It anchored its decision in the Due Process Clause,236 but also 
analyzed how the Equal Protection Clause informed its holding.237 Female breast censorship 
laws do not fit squarely into the framework of these cases.238 Yet, the Supreme Court’s 
discussions about Equal Protection Clause principles buttress the argument that female breast 
censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause.  
In Windsor, the Court explained Equal Protection Clause principles by describing laws 
that violate these principles.  For example, quoting from Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno,239 
Justice Kennedy in Windsor stated:  “The Constitution's guarantee of equality ‘must at the very 
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ justify 
                                                
233 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597. 
234 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. 
235 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (holding that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry 
in all States . . . and . . . that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage 
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character”).  
236 See id. at 2597–98 (discussing the fundamental liberties in the Due Process Clause). The Court found “that same-
sex couples may exercise the right to marry. The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the 
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.” Id. at 2599. 
237 See id. at 2602–03 (for example, the Court noted that “[t]he right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the 
liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment's guarantee of the equal 
protection of the laws. . . Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different 
precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach 
of the other.”). 
238 Among other differences, marriage has a uniquely long and deep social history, see id. at 2593–94, is a 
fundamental right, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598, and a substantial body of Supreme Court doctrine exists on the 
topics of homosexuality and marriage, see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2596–97. Moreover, it is important to note the role 
that federalism played in the Windsor decision.  Specifically, that several states had passed laws legalizing same-sex 
marriage played a part in the Court finding DOMA unconstitutional. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2689, 2695. In the 
case of female breast censorship, there is no single federal law at issue, which states have bucked.  Instead, female 
breast censorship laws exist throughout the country in various cities and states, in various forms.  
239 Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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disparate treatment of that group.”240 More relevant to the female breast censorship context, the 
Court went on to suggest that laws motivated by, and having the effect of, disapproving of a 
class violate Equal Protection Clause principles.241   
 The Windsor Court clarified why DOMA had the purpose and effect of disapproving of 
gay couples, which sheds some light on what constitutes sufficient disapproval to violate Equal 
Protection Clause principles.  The Court found, “[t]he avowed purpose and practical effect of 
[DOMA is] to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into 
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”242  Thus, whether 
a law imposes a disadvantage on a class, a separate status on a class, and a stigma on a class, are 
important inquiries. 
Female breast censorship laws do all three to women, demonstrating the “purpose and 
effect of disapproval of [a] class.”243  First, female breast censorship laws disadvantage women 
by making them more vulnerable to body image issues, and by eliminating the choice to be 
comfortable without a top in public.244  Women are therefore unable to live as freely and fully as 
men.  Second, such laws impose a separate status on women’s breasts, as not only different than 
men’s breasts, but as body parts that must be hidden away from public sight.245  Finally, the law 
brands women’s breasts with a stigma.  The inability to reveal one’s breasts in public further 
                                                
240 Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2693. 
241 See id. (“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so it violates basic due 
process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government . . . In determining whether a law is 
motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially require careful 
consideration. DOMA cannot survive under these principles . . . DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition 
of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits 
and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having 
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.” (internal citations and quotation omitted)). 
242 Id; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (discussing inequality between same-sex and opposite-sex couples 
from exercising a fundamental right, and noting “[e]specially against a long history of disapproval of their 
relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The 
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stigmatizes female breasts as erotic body parts that require covering.246  The stigmatization of 
female breasts creates a danger of stigmatizing the women to whom they are attached.  
The Obergefell Court recognized that “in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause . . . 
new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most 
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”247 Modern science, 
protest movements, social organizations, and fashion trends provide such insights and societal 
understandings, which reveal unjustified inequality in the public display of breasts between the 
sexes. Windsor and Obergefell’s discussions of Equal Protection Clause principles strengthen the 
conclusion that female breast censorship laws violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Aside from a handful of cases, courts have consistently upheld facially discriminatory 
laws that censor the female breast.  Initially, then, it might appear difficult for a court faced with 
an Equal Protection Clause challenge today to overturn a breast censorship law without flying in 
the face of that precedent.248  
Yet, a proper intermediate scrutiny analysis requires courts to consider modern 
community norms, at least when the government advances a public sensibilities argument.  
Modern community norms about the public female breast have changed.  As evidenced by social 
organizations, fashion trends, and protest movements, modern society is increasingly accepting 
of the public female breast.  When courts take into account this modern understanding of 
society’s perception of the public female breast, it is clear that female breast censorship laws 
cannot withstand constitutional muster.  Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause principles as 
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247 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
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recently articulated by the Supreme Court further support the finding that female breast 
censorship laws are unconstitutional. 
Laws prohibiting public displays of the female breast, but not the male breast, are 
outdated and harmful.  More significantly, they are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.   
 
 
 
 
  
